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-/https://github.com/berriai/litellm/issues/29895
GitHub · issue

#29895 [FEAT] Post-call receipt middleware for tamper-evident audit trails — EU AI Act Article 12

  • State: open
  • Author: @arian-gogani

## Problem

LiteLLM routes LLM API calls across providers with a unified interface. For enterprise deployments in regulated industries, the call logs that LiteLLM produces are operator-controlled — they can't be independently verified by an auditor who doesn't trust the operator's infrastructure.

EU AI Act Article 12 (enforcement August 2, 2026) requires tamper-evident automatic logging for high-risk AI systems. 'Tamper-evident' implies independent verification — not just structured logging.

## Proposed: Post-call receipt hook

LiteLLM's callback system (`success_callback`, `failure_callback`) is the right integration point. A receipt callback that generates an Ed25519-signed, hash-chained record after each LLM call:

```python from litellm import completion import litellm from nobulex import Agent as NobulexAgent

nobulex = NobulexAgent('litellm-gateway')

def on_success(kwargs, completion_response, start_time, end_time): receipt = nobulex.sign_receipt( action_type=kwargs.get('model', 'unknown'), scope=str(kwargs.get('messages', [{}])[0].get('content', ''))[:200] ) # Ed25519 signed, hash-chained # Any auditor with the public key can verify offline…

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vote history (3 events)
#0 of 0 · 31d19h3m16s ago — entered · #import:https:::github.com:berriai:litellm post #2136
The left issue requires cross-cutting audit architecture, cryptographic signing and canonicalization, chain/state persistence, callback reliability, verification tooling, and compliance-sensitive design. The right issue is comparatively localized provider-specific message translation with focused regression coverage.
The right issue is substantially harder because it introduces a cross-cutting security and compliance feature involving cryptographic signing, tamper-evident chaining, callback lifecycle integration, durable verification semantics, failure handling, privacy boundaries, and extensive testing. The left issue is a localized schema-conversion fix within an existing request translation path.
#0 of 0 · 31d18h9m53s ago — current · #import:https:::github.com:berriai:litellm post #3019
The right issue is substantially harder: it requires designing and integrating a new security-sensitive, cryptographic audit mechanism with callback lifecycle behavior, durable chaining, key management, verification tooling, performance considerations, and broad testing. The left issue is a narrowly scoped authorization configuration change involving existing read-only routes.
discussed in #import:https:::github.com:berriai:litellm

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